insecur is experimental and prelaunch. There is no public sign-up yet, and the hosted service is not approved for valuable production secrets. Local Mode runs the development loop with no account.

Audit and verification

Every meaningful action in insecur writes a tenant-scoped, metadata-only audit event: who acted, what resource, when, the event code, and the full principal chain including agent attribution. Audit events never contain secret values.

You read the feed live with insecur audit tail, and you produce signed, independently verifiable bundles with insecur audit export. Anyone can check a bundle offline with insecur audit verify.

Tail recent events

insecur audit tail --limit 50

audit tail prints recent events, newest activity first. All fields are metadata.

Flag Purpose
--limit <count> Number of events to return. Default 25.
--from <iso8601> Only events at or after this time.
--to <iso8601> Only events at or before this time.
--cursor <cursor> Continue from a previous page.
--actor-user-id <id> Filter to a human actor.
--actor-machine-identity-id <id> Filter to a machine identity.
--project-id <id> Filter to a project.
--env-id <id> Filter to an environment.
--event-code <code> Filter to a single event code.

Example, filtering to one environment and event code:

insecur audit tail --env-id env_2b9 --event-code secret.version.promoted --json

A representative event, metadata only:

{
  "eventCode": "secret.version.promoted",
  "occurredAt": "2026-07-09T14:02:11Z",
  "resource": { "type": "secret_version", "id": "sv_7c1" },
  "principalChain": [
    { "type": "user", "id": "usr_18a" },
    { "type": "agent", "tag": "release-bot" }
  ]
}

Export a signed bundle

insecur audit export --from 2026-07-01T00:00:00Z --to 2026-07-09T00:00:00Z

Both --from and --to are required. The export produces JSONL events plus a signed manifest. Signing uses Ed25519, and the signing keys are custodied server-side in the private Runtime deploy. The bundle is tamper-evident and independently verifiable.

Verify a bundle offline

insecur audit verify events.jsonl --manifest manifest.json

audit verify recomputes the bundle over the JSONL and checks it against the signed manifest, offline. You supply the verifying key material through one of these flags.

Flag Purpose
--published-signing-keys <path> Path to the published signing-keys document.
--published-signing-keys-env <name> Env var holding the published signing-keys document.
--signing-public-key-env <name> Env var holding a single Ed25519 public key.
--hmac-secret-env <name> Env var holding the HMAC secret for the bundle.

Published signing keys

Current and historical Ed25519 public keys are published at:

https://insecur.cloud/.well-known/insecur/audit-export-signing-keys.json

This is a metadata-only document. It lets anyone verify a bundle without contacting the API, which is why the claim ceiling here is exactly this: exports are tamper-evident and independently verifiable.

Fetch the published keys and verify in one flow:

export INSECUR_AUDIT_EXPORT_PUBLISHED_SIGNING_KEYS="$(cat published-keys.json)"
insecur audit verify events.jsonl \
  --manifest manifest.json \
  --published-signing-keys-env INSECUR_AUDIT_EXPORT_PUBLISHED_SIGNING_KEYS

The console audit view

The web console has a filterable audit view at the org level. The CLI and the console read the same events, so what you filter in one you can reproduce in the other.